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Abstract
In the coming decades, natural gas is poised on the brink of gaining increasing
salience in meeting international energy demands. As a moot case in point,
its share in the global energy basket continues to maintain an upward
trajectory vis-à-vis the conventional dominance of coal and oil. The persisting
mismatch between the cost-effectiveness and the energy-efficiency, plaguing
most renewable energy resources, gives the cleaner, natural gas burning an
added advantage as a bridge-fuel. Being a rising power with accentuating
economic credentials to speak for, India seems to have actively embraced
the growing importance of natural gas. This has translated into efforts aimed
at raising the proportion of natural gas in its domestic energy mix. The fact
that the country has insufficient conventional hydrocarbon reserves to feed
its expanding consumer and industrial base makes it heavily dependent on
imports of the conventional hydrocarbons from abroad. Nevertheless, it would
be unjust not to mention some of the far-sighted measures being taken to
dovetail hydrocarbon imports (particularly natural gas) with a targeted boost
in domestic production.
This article attempts to assess the current and prospective role of natural
gas in meeting the demands of India’s energy security. It seeks to evaluate
the potentialities for accelerating natural gas induction in the country’s energy
mix, with a focus on domestic production as well as imports. By highlighting
the challenges confronting the Indian hydrocarbon sector in general and
domestic exploration-and-production in particular, this paper makes a critical
assessment of the manifold reforms that have been initiated to address this
concern. Through a perusal of the major local, regional and global
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determinants that shape India’s outlook towards natural gas, a modest attempt
has been made to try to help in the evolution of a roadmap for the country in
terms of transitioning to a largely gas-based economy.
For years since the advent of oil exploration, the natural gas from
hydrocarbon reservoirs was either burned away or injected back into the fields
to force out oil that ran out of natural pressure. Commercially-optimised
extraction of the gas was an overlooked idea not only because of inadequate
technology but also because the usability of gas as a significant energy source
was not a priority back then. It was only towards the close of the last century
that the economic viability of natural gas as a cleaner, safer and efficient energy
source was recognised the world over. Being the cleanest burning fossil fuel, it
already constitutes, and is touted to play an increasingly vital role in the global
energy supply. Perhaps, judging from the world energy outlook for the foreseeable
future, natural gas is likely to pervade the global energy consumption mix as
the demand for coal and oil begins to peak. With the inevitable delays plaguing
the renewable energy industry in terms of bridging the gap between cost and
energy efficiency, the era of fossil fuels is likely to persist longer – albeit with
better sustainability – provided natural gas acts as the game changer.
India is no stranger to the rising prominence of natural gas in the global energy
lexicon. From negotiating import contracts for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
with multiple suppliers, Indian decision makers are seriously contemplating
transnational gas pipeline projects from gas-rich countries in its proximate
neighbourhood. There is a visible, concerted effort from the national oil
companies to expand their footprints across a number of onshore and offshore
hydrocarbon prospects, even on foreign soil. From what had hitherto been
investments confined to the exploration and production of (mostly) equity oil
from participating interests abroad, Indian oil majors have over the years, now
diversified their portfolio to include significant investments in gas exploration
and LNG projects too.
Assessing India’s Natural Gas Reserves
India is not a resource-scarce nation per se. But insofar as hydrocarbons are
concerned, the consumption rate of petroleum-based by-products and fuels far
outweighs the rate of domestic exploration and production. It would be wrong
to assume that the country’s gas reserves have been optimally exploited.
Domestic challenges – ranging from techno-logistical to environmental and
sociological – have scourged the progress of oil and gas exploration within the
country, since independence. Political expediency and bureaucratic complacency
have only added to the woes of a disincentivised domestic exploration campaign.
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Of the 26 identified hydrocarbon-bearing sedimentary basins within the country’s
territorial limits, only seven have been explored – with many lagging behind
their target production capacities. This means that almost 75 percent of India’s
sedimentary reservoirs that are conducive to petroleum formation still remain
mostly unexplored, or at the most, partly-explored (GE, 2017).
Since the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the early 1990s, there
have been concerted efforts to reform the country’s energy sector, particularly
the petroleum and natural gas industry. In contemporary times, there appears to
be a strong incentive to push for Greenfield and Brownfield investments in the
upstream segment of the oil and gas sector. What is pertinent is that the country’s
rapid economic growth warrants a concrete policy of meeting energy security
with a combination of domestically-sourced and imported fuels. India’s
commitment to the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)
declared as part of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, further calls
for a gradual shift to cleaner forms of energy. This goes in direct conjunction
with the need for scaling up the percentage of natural gas in the domestic energy
mix. In the course of fulfilling its long-term sustainable energy targets, select
policy reforms and business strategies are being considered, with the end result
slated to be a rejuvenated and empowered energy sector with an augmented
emphasis on natural gas promotion.
Since the inception of hydrocarbon prospecting in independent India,
an estimated 69 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven and probable conventional
gas deposits have been prospected and identified as recoverable. A sizeable
chunk of these recoverable reserves await judicious extraction and full-fledged
development, with a considerable number of reserves yet to see lucrative
production. Apart from the already discovered hydrocarbon reservoirs, more
recent geophysical surveys have revealed the existence of recoverable traces of
natural gas trapped either in shale rock formations or between coal seams (in
the form of shale gas and coal-bed methane gas respectively) (GE, 2017). Much
of the domestic oil and gas production had long come from the Bombay/Mumbai
High offshore field (discovered in 1974 by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation)
off the north-western coast of India. However, with the oil platform (installed
as part of the first phase of field-development) moving past its peak production
capacity within a decade and a half since discovery, the declining production
from the western offshore is being gradually compensated with new production
capacities coming online in the more promising eastern offshore segment
(Offshore-technology, 2017). The good news however is that the Bombay High
offshore basin has more to offer, and the second phase of field redevelopment
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has already been met with some success in the form of a sizeable oil and gas
find in close proximity to the existing one (Reuters, 2017).
On top of the continuing efforts to develop ageing and mature fields, new
onshore gas prospects – both conventional and from coal beds – are being
commissioned and made operational following successful pilot projects by the
public sector undertakings (PSUs) and also a few private sector companies, not
to mention joint-venture undertakings. Shale gas assessment was carried out on
a pilot-basis in many prospective regions, with assistance from the United States
Geological Survey (USGS, 2011).
Another important category of identified ‘unconventional hydrocarbon
basins’ falls in the deepwater segment – off (implying offshore) the western and
eastern peninsular seaboard – and further off the Andaman island chain. These
deepwater basins are found beyond the 400 metres depth range along the
continental margins. Nevertheless, the majority of contemporary domestic gas
production is met by the offshore segment, with deepwater exploration made
increasingly sustainable with the advancements in hydrocarbon engineering and
offshore oilfield technology. Complementing these improving prospects offshore
are augmented production levels from existing onshore gas fields (Brownfield
projects). This is made possible with increasing foreign investments, which
facilitated the entry of the latest state-of-the-art cutting-edge technologies. For
instance, the last few years have seen an uptick/ upward trend in Brownfield
investments targeted at ramping up gas extraction and recovery from mature
fields in the traditional producing regions of Assam, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh;
besides having Greenfield investments in hydrocarbon basins in Tripura,
Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Governmnet
of India, 2017).
On the upside, coal-bed methane (CBM) extraction is another fast emerging
mode of unconventional gas production in India. For a country blessed with
abundant coal deposits (albeit mostly of poor or average grades), technological
developments permitting the extraction of methane/natural gas trapped between
coal seams have irrefutably come as a breakthrough. Other than CBM, successful
pilot projects are signalling the possibility of shale gas extraction from risky,
recoverable shale entrapments that are widely disseminated across India’s
rich alluvial floodplains and adjoining river basins (Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Gas, Governmnet of India, 2017). However, despite the innovations in
hydrocarbon exploration harbingered by the arrival of horizontal drilling, it
remains to be seen how the fallouts from fracking/hydraulic fracturing (the
flagship technique used in shale gas extraction) would potentially impact a
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country like India, given its sensitive environmental and demographic
constitution.
The Hydrocarbon Majors
Oil India Limited (OIL) and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited
(ONGC) are the two premier state-held oil and gas exploration companies (or
PSUs) in India. While ONGC is a multinational company in its own right, ONGC
Videsh Limited (OVL) is the exclusive overseas arm of the former. These
companies are more or less restricted to upstream operations (exploration,
production and development) while the bulk of the downstream operations
(refining/processing, distribution and marketing) within the country are a
monopoly of the other three state-owned giants, namely Indian Oil Corporation
Limited (IOCL), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) and Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL). The midstream operations (includes
operations ranging from transporting processed and unprocessed petroleum to
building and operating the necessary transportation infrastructure such as
pipelines) are carried out predominantly by IOCL and Gas Authority of India
Limited (GAIL) – the latter being the largest state-owned gas processing and
distribution company in India. On the other hand, Indian-origin private
companies like Reliance Industries Limited (RIL), Cairn India (a subsidiary of
UK-based Cairn Energy), Essar Oil Limited and Tata Petrodyne have over the
years made praiseworthy strides in the petroleum business; transcending multiple
segments of the industry (India Brand Equity Foundation, 2017).
Within the realm of natural gas, LNG imports have been gaining traction on
a scale of greater magnitude in comparison with the envisioned plans to expedite
indigenous natural gas extraction and recovery. Petronet LNG Limited – a joint
venture-cum-consortium of India’s premier state-owned petroleum companies
– has over the years evolved into a top-notch company catering exclusively to
LNG import operations. Its portfolio ranges from contracting LNG containers
to building and operating LNG terminals for gas liquefaction, not to mention
regasification terminals for converting the cryogenic (chilled) liquefied gas back
to dry gas (Petronet LNG Limited, 2016). Under the stewardship of GAIL and
its subsidiary Petronet, India has been seeking to expand its footprint in the
global LNG market. This is by virtue of forming joint ventures and consortiums
for LNG commerce with other foreign multinationals and national oil companies,
in addition to acquiring equity stakes in foreign oil and gas blocks (following
the lead of India’s most successful overseas oil exploration giant, OVL) (LNG
World News Staff, 2016). The latter has garnered sufficient experience in
participating in Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), refers to the legal contract
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between the government (the rightful owner of the land and the resource
underneath) and contractor (the company) that enables the latter to explore and
produce equity oil from working interests held in oil and gas blocks. However,
with an added preference for natural gas in the evolving paradigm of India’s
energy consumption, OVL is slowly expanding its ambit of operations to focus
more on exploration and development of natural gas blocks on foreign soil (Patey,
2014, pp. 123-157). Though OIL has not emulated OVL’s feats in the overseas
component, of late, there is an increasing realisation of the need to set right its
dismal record abroad (Oil India Limited, 2014).
With an eye on the shifting sands in energy geopolitics, India’s priorities lie
in safe and lucrative access to the various sources of natural gas that abound its
geostrategic radar. As mentioned previously, a key element here is facilitating
its oil companies (most importantly, OVL) in acquiring working interests abroad
through PSCs. Secondly, India is simultaneously diversifying its LNG imports
by signing lucrative contracts with its traditional suppliers, while at the same
time, seeking new suppliers with whom it is negotiating flexible contract options.
Furthermore, long-lasting global geo-economic spinoffs from the protracted era
of low oil prices have opened the window for buying LNG in the spot market,
and incipiently in the speculation-driven futures market. This has given net
importers like India a better leverage in negotiating the prices of short-term,
medium-term and long-term LNG supply contracts with rising LNG exporters
such as Australia and the United States – apart from revamping already existing
contracts (in keeping up with the changing contours of the global geo-economic
environment) with traditional suppliers like Qatar (Slav, 2017).
Role of Regulatory Regimes: Challenges and Prospects
A significant breakthrough in the petroleum and natural gas sector began
with the gradual deregulation of the pricing regime for the hydrocarbon-based
fuels. For a long time, the Administered Pricing Mechanism (APM) was the
standard modus operandi followed by the government in fixing the price of oil
and natural gas. This necessitated the oil and gas marketing companies to sell
the product at government-mandated prices to the favoured consumer base,
which in the case of gas chiefly constituted the fertiliser industry and the power
plants, following which came the less-privileged masses for whom LPG
(Liquefied Petroleum Gas) and kerosene were heavily subsidised by the
government – in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s welfare-centric mandates
(Government of India, 2014). Such socialistic measures, though altruistic,
nevertheless increased the debt burden on the government by virtue of incessant
subsidisation and subsequent liability accrual.
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The APM had its own shortcomings that got illustrated in the form of a
state-supported stymieing of competition in the hydrocarbon exploration,
production and retail/marketing business. The government-approved nomination
of specific hydrocarbon blocks to state companies held back the entry of the
private sector in the oil exploration business while quota-denominated marketing
dissuaded private players from partaking in the downstream segment, which
primarily involved distribution and retail. This in turn created debt-burdened
public sector giants which had to resort to unrestricted borrowing to make up
for their growing capital expenditure and outstanding dividend payments.
Unrestricted borrowing by the state companies from commercial banks naturally
gave the government a free hand to intervene in the monetary policies of the
Reserve Bank of India. As a consequence, these companies were many a times
given loans on government-mandated fixed interest rates, further exacerbating
the huge pile of bad debt accumulation (GKToday, 2015).
The APM was a prime contributor to India’s balance of payments crisis that
force-started the liberalisation of its economy. Following the liberalisation
reforms of the 1990s, the successive governments tried to rid the oil sector of
the regulatory clutches of the APM; albeit with partial success. The result was a
failure to whittle down the convoluted bureaucratic system built around the
agenda of petroleum subsidies. This compounded the acrimony of the state
exploration companies, which were unable to optimise the profits from the
decade-long era of high oil prices that lasted until mid-2014. Multiple efforts
from previous administrations to move towards a market-based pricing regime
either got stonewalled or produced only partial results owing to bureaucratic
constraints and a lack of political will. Nevertheless, the incumbent
administration of Narendra Modi has been exercising concerted efforts at
expediting this long-sought transition, and the fruits of these efforts are panning
out in the form of nascent reforms in the overall pricing mechanism for
hydrocarbon fuels. Needless to say, the government enormously benefited from
the sudden fall in global crude oil prices (since mid-2014). A top-down approach
is being implemented on the basis of the Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing
Policy (HELP), coupled with a market-based pricing methodology for the
consumer-retailer interface distributed across the country.
With a focus on restructuring the regulatory regime that had hitherto
dominated the hydrocarbon sector, the new regime has been designed to
transcend the multiple strata of the beams and pillars that make up India’s massive
petroleum industry. The latest overhaul is designed to trickle down the multiple
vertical compartments in the upstream sector – all the way from the award of
exploration licenses and production contracts to the pricing of the extracted
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hydrocarbons at the well-head. This will eventually help in determining the
selling price of these fuels at the various retail outlets and fuel stations spread
across the country (Press Information Bureau, Government of India Cabinet,
2016).
The HELP was promulgated keeping in mind the manifold challenges facing
India’s oil and gas sector. HELP is a modification of the already existing New
Exploration and Licensing Policy (NELP). The former was conceived to address
the criticisms generated by the latter because the reformatory character of NELP
suffered attenuation from inherent limitations rooted at the policy level. Under
NELP, the Indian state-owned upstream companies, OIL and ONGC, were no
longer to be given preferential treatment in the allocation of exploration blocks.
Although the policy formally came into effect in 1999, for many years, it could
only be implemented in bits and pieces, and such haphazardly execution was
the by-product of political and bureaucratic complications triggered by short-
sighted domestic compulsions. Nevertheless, the year 2017 saw the phasing-
out of the final vestiges of the APM that had continued to plague the effective
implementation of the NELP. The roll-out of the HELP was a concomitant
response to the inability of NELP to catapult India’s domestic hydrocarbon
production to meet the rising energy demand (PTI, 2017).
It is imperative here to understand that the purported objective of HELP is
to effect the transformation from a quasi-liberal hydrocarbon regime to a fully-
liberalised one. Nevertheless, NELP had its own share of reforms and partial
deregulation to speak of; 100 percent Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) had been
allowed in the upstream segment with no mandatory participation of state majors
in PSCs. The state companies would also have to compete with other Indian
private and foreign companies in an open international bidding; and acreage
royalties (to be paid to the government) were fixed at 12.5 percent for onshore
regions and 10 percent for offshore locations. Furthermore, companies no longer
needed to pay an import tariff for machinery (for operations) shipped from
abroad; and near-complete autonomy was granted to the Indian private and
foreign companies to market the oil and gas in the domestic market which had
hitherto been a privilege of the state marketing majors. With regard to PSCs,
the same fiscal and contractual terms would apply to every company (regardless
of whether it is state-owned or not) that has been awarded a working interest in
select blocks – barring the only caveat that the PSCs would nonetheless be
structured and customised in consonance with applicable Indian Laws, subject
to an India-centric regulatory and jurisdictional framework (Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, 2015).
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So where did NELP fail to deliver? The simple answer is that most of what
was penned on paper was not possible to be put into action on the ground. For
one, complications arose from having disparate licensing policies for different
hydrocarbon resources and different exploratory blocks (classified into NELP
and pre-NELP). So, in the event of an overlapping of the resources between
separate contracts, the government is caught off-guard in terms of administering
the producer price of the extracted resource. Since the clauses have already
been set, there is no window for accommodating unanticipated externalities
and cost overruns. Since the PSCs under NELP have relied on the ‘profit-sharing’
logic for government revenue generation, unless and until the discovery is made,
the company just needs to pay the acreage royalties and corporate tax to the
government – and not the mineral/resource royalties. (or profits). However,
hydrocarbon exploration is a risky business and it generally takes a long time
for production to begin; or sometimes, there are cases where no oil (or gas) is
struck. Owing to such uncertainties, the governmental polity and the bureaucracy
gets inadvertently attuned to a long gestation period, wherein the ruling
machinery tends to use its discretionary powers to micromanage the contractor’s
contractual obligations. This incipient friction could lead to unwarranted delays
in the development of the discovered hydrocarbon reserves. Legal disputes would
ensue between the contractor and the government, resulting in an environment
that is not investor-friendly (Press Information Bureau, Government of India
Cabinet, 2017).
The government’s share of the profit is normally computed on the basis of a
predetermined percentage rate agreed upon during the bidding. Nevertheless,
in case of a commercial discovery, the contractor has the right to recover the
input costs before sharing the profits with the government. However, if the rate
of extraction/production of the resource is below the level estimated by the
contractor (during initial prospecting), it can have spill over consequences for
the sharing of profits with the government. But the contractor would have already
incurred massive expenditures in the exploration phase and the NELP gives it
the right to recover these costs regardless of the output rate. It is only during the
profit-sharing phase after production that the loopholes in the NELP really start
unravelling. The profits would naturally dwindle as the output declines whereas
the contractor would still have to pay the government its share on the basis of
the already predetermined rates. This results in time-consuming disputes between
both the parties, which in turn impacts the stock value of the contractor company
and exacerbates investor fear. The protracted legal tussle between the government
on the one side and RIL and British Petroleum (BP) on the other, over the issue
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of under-productivity from RIL’s KG-D6 gas basin, is but one example of the
pitfalls associated with the profit-sharing principle (PTI, 2017).
In addition to these, under the NELP, despite the base price of crude oil
being pegged to market rates, the price of natural gas was still subject to
government approval generally dictated by inflexible parameters articulated in
the PSC. Lastly, the royalty rates under NELP do not take into account, or specific
detail the topographical classifications within offshore locations, namely shallow,
deep and ultra-deep water basins – thus providing a recipe for further
complications (Press Information Bureau, Government of India Cabinet, 2016).
The operational challenges faced by the contractors and the government
under NELP paved the way for the appointment of two important committees
(during Manmohan Singh’s second term as Prime Minister) to study and offer
solutions to the underlying problems. First, the Rangarajan Committee (RC) in
2012, and then the Kelkar Committee (KC) in 2013, came up respectively with
specific sets of recommendations. The RC proposed a revenue-sharing model
in place of the pre-existing cost-recovery and profit-sharing one. Accordingly,
the government would receive a share of the contractor’s resource revenues
immediately after the royalty payments are made. The committee batted for
shunning the cost-recovery mechanism by appealing to the contractors to improve
technological and logistical efficiency, and thereby bring down the cost of
exploration and production. The government would in return incentivise the
contract terms to enable the contractor a hassle-free operating environment –
implying that the former would remain a passive facilitator and not an active
stakeholder in operations. It must be borne in mind that the RC based its rationale
on the then contemporaneous exorbitant global oil prices. Hence, it believed
that the contractor could easily make up for the risk involved in foregoing cost-
recovery and could at the same time optimise its oil sales’ profits into improving
efficiency and enabling cost-effective operations (Government of India, 2014).
However, the following year, debates ensued with regard to the efficacy of
relinquishing the cost-recovery and profit-sharing model. Thus, the KC was
constituted, specifically with the agenda of chalking out a strategy to bring
down the excessive reliance on expensive hydrocarbon imports and scale up
domestic production. Emphasis was laid on Brownfield investments aimed at
revitalising ageing and mature fields and reverse the trend of stagnating – or
otherwise – dwindling production. The KC argued that cost-recovery would be
better suited as it had a more lucrative appeal to the contractor who will need to
incur additional costs to develop India’s ageing fields and enhance resource-
recovery. Further, the government’s role as passive overseer would be completely
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eliminated and the contractor would enjoy the liberty to decide the cost of
exploration and production without a governmental imposition of a ceiling.
One major recommendation of KC was to provide a window for the government
to assess the contractor’s computation of the profit share; meanwhile, until the
contractor sees an enormous jump in profits earned through sales, government
revenue would be confined to receiving royalty payments and corporate tax
collection. KC’s argument for complete deregulation was based on the logic
that the exchequer is committed to pay the highest price for the consumption of
a precious commodity that is also a prerogative of the future generations to
harness (Coventus Law, 2016).
As for pricing, while RC supported only partial deregulation of prices, KC
gave the contractor the freedom to peg producer prices at market rates, giving
way to arms-length pricing. RC, although accepting crude oil price deregulation,
did not vouch the same for natural gas – since it believed that India was then
still in the fledgling stages of injecting natural gas into its energy mix and
competition in the gas sector was still nascent. For the same reason, it insisted
that the base price of natural gas be computed on the basis of the weighted
average of the three major global crude benchmarks. KC on the other hand
suggested complete deregulation such that the producer has the freedom to
determine selling prices of the extracted commodity. It reinforced the cost-
recovery and profit-sharing mechanism which was a hallmark of the Production
Sharing Contract (PSC) legacy, whereas the RC had suggested scrapping the
PSC model in favour of the Revenue Sharing Contract (RSC) model.
Notwithstanding the bold recommendations of both the committees, NELP could
not be fully refined as the government itself found the going tough in terms of
segregating the terms and conditions for pre-NELP blocks (which were
previously nominated by the government to private players, albeit with
mandatory participating interest held by either ONGC or OIL) and associated
contracts from those contracts negotiated under the NELP regime (Coventus
Law, 2016).
The Narendra Modi administration has had to tread carefully through the
quandary that was presented by the regulatory regimes, both of the present and
the past. Following a thorough reassessment of the situation, a new mechanism
was devised– albeit one that tries to toe a fine balance between both committee
recommendations. Thus was born the HELP, accompanied by certain
unprecedented reforms and fundamental recalibrations to the existing and
previous exploration and pricing regimes. Some of the basic parameters of the
new regime were synthesised from the recommendations given by the
abovementioned committees. Commensurate with the RC findings, the principle
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of revenue sharing (RSC) was adopted. Meanwhile, a single uniform licensing
policy was introduced that works on the open acreage licensing model. This
was a brainchild of the KC. On a similar vein, complete freedom has been
granted to the licensee/contractor in terms of marketing and pricing of the oil,
while special consideration has been extended to high-risk undertakings such
as High Pressure High Temperature (HPHT), Deepwater (DW) and Ultra-
deepwater (UDW) finds. However, the freedom to fix gas prices does come
with certain restraints, whereby the government would still maintain a price
ceiling computed every six months on the basis of thoroughly chalked-out
formulas (linked to prices in established global gas hubs) separately for normal
discoveries and high-risk ventures. Nevertheless, the complete deregulation of
gas prices may be in the offing, as trading in the commodity is expected to
gather pace. (Press Information Bureau, Governmnet of India Cabinet, 2016).
The open acreage licensing system espoused by HELP seemingly gives a
morale boost to companies that were hitherto willing to invest in Brownfield
and Greenfield ventures in India’s upstream segment, but were wary of the excess
red-tape and governmental oversight. The bellwether for a desirable change in
the contractors’ attitude could perhaps be the unveiling of the first ever National
Data Repository (NDR) by the Union Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas,
Dharmendra Pradhan. The NDR, prepared by the Directorate General of
Hydrocarbons (DGH), contains geophysical and seismic data about the various
hydrocarbon prospects disseminated across India’s 3.14 square kilometres of
sedimentary basins. Interested contractors can make use of the NDR and choose
basins they wish to explore – be it a producing mature field requiring additional
investment, or even, heretofore unexplored regions. The contractor also gets to
delineate an area of its preference for exploration, from unlicensed blocks. The
chosen areas are put up for auction by the government and the highest bidder
(the one offering the highest share of the resource revenue) is awarded the licence
for the block (PTI, 2017).
With the transformation from NELP to HELP in the upstream segment, the
Indian government is placing its bets on increased foreign investment,
particularly in the domain of natural gas extraction and recovery. The essence
of such a transition is to hasten the switch to a full-fledged liberal fiscal regime
dictated primarily by the market forces of demand and supply. At the same
time, one of the immediate priorities has been to add fresh momentum to the
operating capacity of the state exploration giants – ONGC and OIL. These
upstream companies, along with its (state-held) oil and gas marketing
counterparts and transport facilitators have been earmarked for a major revamp.
Merger is one of the outstanding plans floated by the government for upgrading
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the efficiency of these companies. Correspondingly, the government has
announced the possibility of a merger between ONGC and HPCL on the one
hand, and OIL and IOCL on the other. The objective is to create world-class
vertically integrated hydrocarbon majors that will be able to balance the losses
suffered by the upstream segment with the windfalls made by the downstream
segment under the persisting era of low oil prices – and vice-versa, as the trend
shifts (FE Online, 2017). To further increase the stock value of these publically-
listed companies, proposed step-by-step divestment of government-held shares
is expected to fetch the desired outcome of reinvigorated public companies
financed more on equity and less on debts.
LNG Diplomacy: Transcending Oceans and Terminals
With domestic oil consumption soaring year after year, India’s share of net
natural gas consumption has however, not maintained a similar trajectory over
the last half a decade. (Boersma, et al., 2017). This inconsistency was mainly
attributed to depleting domestic production, cost-ineffectiveness and above all,
the mismatch between installed power generation capacity and installed
transmission-cum-distribution capacity that disincentivised power utilities from
buying the expensive gas (Ernst & Young, 2015). Through initiating reformatory
legislations in the hydrocarbon sector, the Modi administration has evinced
interest in expediting the transition from coal and oil to natural gas. Along with
the restructuring of the domestic hydrocarbon industry in the quest for augmented
natural gas production, a red-carpet strategy is being modelled with respect to
LNG imports. Capitalising on the timely advent of low oil and gas prices, besides
banking on the ‘fresh blood’ injected into the global LNG trade, India has been
negotiating lucrative import contracts (and renegotiating previously signed ones)
with multiple suppliers (The Hindu, 2017). Among these are new and existing
contracts that range from ‘long-term’ in nature, to medium as well as short-
term. The price slump has also pushed India to buy LNG in the spot market
(ICIS, 2017).
Moreover, some of the long and medium term contracts for which the price
was already set, have been renegotiated on account of the low spot prices. Such
signs are a clear indication that there is a strong buyer’s market for LNG emerging
in Asia, with countries like India, China, South Korea and Japan ramping up
their imports of the fuel. With never-before-seen volumes of spot LNG cargoes
replacing long-term contract-based shipments to India and the Northeast Asian
economies (especially as oil prices reached a nadir in 2016), LNG traders are
looking to hedge themselves from unexpected price fluctuations. This has
harbingered the growth of futures trading contracts for LNG, focusing on the
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Asian markets, and lately with a keen eye on India in particular (LNG World
News, 2017).
Qatar has long enjoyed the privilege of being the world’s undisputed LNG
export machine. The small Persian Gulf monarchy even managed to reprise its
role as a reliable exporter amid the mid-2017 diplomatic standoff with Saudi
Arabia and its cohort of nations (Sergie, Inajima, & Dipaola, 2017). Of late,
thanks to its booming offshore gas and CBM discoveries, Australian gas exports
have surged, as new LNG terminals are going on-stream along its west-to-north-
western coast. However, the most formidable long-term challenge to the
undisputed export monopoly of Qatar and the invigorated LNG boom in Australia
comes from the United States (US). Aided by the domestic shale revolution and
the introduction of cost-effective oilfield technologies by companies operating
on and off the Gulf of Mexico, the US is on the course to becoming one of the
world’s leading exporters of LNG. The reversal of the 40year-long moratorium
on hydrocarbon exports (by the Barack Obama administration in 2015) has
transformed the US’ role from that of a net petroleum importer to one of a rising
net exporter. To top it off, the ‘pro-drilling’ policies of the incumbent Donald
Trump administration has propelled the United States to the top echelons in
terms of domestic gas production. The accentuated vigour in the construction
of new gas liquefaction facilities along the Louisiana and Texas coastline is
only a natural forerunner of increasing American LNG exports to come by (Kraus,
2017). Apart from the exporting giants, traditional petro-producers like Malaysia,
Indonesia and Nigeria have also made decent strides in the LNG export business.
Massive gas discoveries off the Eastern Mediterranean in recent times have
further pushed countries like Egypt and Israel to consider exporting LNG in a
big way (International Gas Union, 2017).
LNG trade has indeed become more cost-effective over the times, and
improved technological innovations appear to justify this argument.
Nevertheless, the construction of liquefaction and regasification terminals
continues to be a relatively, costly and time-consuming process. Whatever cost-
minimising technological and logistical progress has been made so far, it has
been a result of the surplus windfalls pocketed by the oil companies in the
bygone boom-time of oil prices. Notwithstanding the fact that the global oil
prices have nose-dived since mid-2014, the price rally over the past few months
have seen crude prices rebound to the USD 70 per barrel mark, only to stabilise
around the USD 60s. On an average, following the price nadir of early 2016, the
oil glut was somewhat counterbalanced by a rallying demand from the Asian
economies, coupled with continuing compliance to the oil-production-cuts
espoused by Saudi-led Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
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(OPEC) and non-OPEC Russia. Rather than actual per-capita demand being
the chief determinant, the driving forces behind this demand surge now are the
respective governments (and their petroleum marketing companies) that are
opportunistically importing large quantities of cheaper oil and gas to pay off the
fuel subsidy burdens accrued over the years of higher prices (Corbeau, Braaksma,
Hussin, Yagoto, & Yamamoto, 2014). Though several small oil and gas producers
went bust in this short span of time, the bigger and resolute ones were able to
absorb the manifold shocks of incessant price fluctuations.
Besides, these producers have gradually got acclimatised to the new highs
and lows in crude oil prices. In responding to these new price realities, there is
a natural impetus on the part of the producers to reduce their break-even costs
by improving operational capabilities. However, one crucial area where gas
trumps oil in a big way is the projected rise in long-term demand for the former
vis-à-vis the latter. On top of that, with the burgeoning international commerce
in dry natural gas and LNG, new pricing benchmarks/indexes are being adopted
that de-hyphenate gas prices from global crude oil prices (The Maritime
Executive, 2017). The over-arching scenario has awakened the conventional
natural gas exporters (heretofore relying mainly on dry gas shipments through
pipelines) to the growing prominence of LNG. The writing on the wall is that in
the upcoming era of natural gas, one will have to complement pipeline shipments
with the ocean-faring and longer-distance-covering LNG carriers.
Some optimism may be expected in the way the Modi administration,
particularly the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MPNG) headed by
Dharmendra Pradhan, is taking steps to revitalise India’s otherwise more or less
stagnating hydrocarbon sector. True that the low oil prices have been a blessing
for the government in initiating groundbreaking reforms, and in the meantime,
increasing fiscal revenue by maintaining higher taxes on an incontestably
polluting commodity.
However, in the long run, in signalling a shift to a gas-based economy, the
possibility of a complete deregulation of the domestic gas market exists in the
pipeline. As a starting point to this, India plans to establish its very own natural
gas hub / trading platform in the near future. However, such a possibility is
contingent on a proactive programme of ramping up domestic gas production
alongside building a well-integrated transport infrastructure network linking
the country’s multiple distribution points with its producing fields and LNG
import terminals (ET Bureau, 2017). The materialisation of an India-centric
gas trading hub is a crucial element in the creation of a regional pricing index
that ensures competitive pricing of natural gas in the domestic consumer market.
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Once accomplished, this would follow on the lines of established global gas-
pricing benchmarks like the US Henry Hub, UK NBP, Average German Import
Price cif (Cost Insurance and Freight) and the Japan LNG cif (The Maritime
Executive, 2017).
Gauging the rising clout of the Asian LNG market, India has also sought to
forge mutually-beneficial marketing alliances with fellow importers like Japan.
Such an alliance would help ensure maximum flexibility as a net buyer in the
booming LNG business. In light of the low LNG spot prices, GAIL of India had
already renegotiated the supply contract terms with the oil Super-major Exxon
Mobil over shipments from the latter’s Gorgon Project in Australia. In return
for lowering prices, GAIL agreed to increase the volume of gas it would buy as
part of the twenty-year contract. This was followed on the continuing run of
success stories as the renegotiation of contract terms between India’s Petronet
LNG (a subsidiary of GAIL) and Qatar’s RasGas (Slav, 2017).
In future, GAIL intends to modify the existing arrangements for LNG imports
with US-based companies and Russia’s Gazprom too. In the case of the US,
there is already an agreement in place between GAIL and Chenerie Energy for
LNG shipments from the latter’s Sabine Pass terminal in the Gulf Coast. The
Indian gas major has also signed up for LNG imports from Dominion Energy’s
to-be-commissioned Cove Point liquefaction plant (LNG World News Staff,
2017). In addition to imparting amicability to the contract terms, tactful exercise
of consumer advantage has brought India and Japan closer in terms of securing
more lucrative supply deals and concessions from their respective sellers. As
per their understanding, both countries are expected to swap shipments from
each other’s contracts depending on real time logistical profitability. This will
help do away with the ‘Destination Restriction Clause’ – a stringent caveat
underscoring most supply contracts that prevent the buyer from re-exporting
the imported volumes to a third party. Such a competitive model will be beneficial
to a transparent LNG market and should ease out India’s prospects for a regional
gas trading exchange based on actual supply and demand (Reuters, 2017).
Transnational Gas Pipelines: A Pipedream or a Reality?
Sourcing gas from outside the sovereign does not stop with maritime LNG
commerce. In India’s case, the need for a transnational gas pipeline remains a
time-tested proposition. In the years that have passed by, three major transnational
gas pipeline projects were proposed, which eventually found their way to the
doldrums, i.e. they never achieved fruition. These projects are as follows: The
IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India), TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and
the MBI (Myanmar-Bangladesh-India). However, given the momentum in the
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transition to a gas-based economy, there is again a strong revival of interest in
pursuing these projects, which may or may not come into action.
With a keen eye on the massive Galkynysh (also known as Dauletabad) gas
field in Turkmenistan’s Amu Darya Basin, India has expressed its commitment
to bringing TAPI online. Replete with doubts about the transit of the pipeline
through the restive regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the daunting question
of the times is whether economics will ultimately trump geopolitics. And if so,
will the question of energy security see the light of the day? What is path-breaking
is the agreement reached between the Afghan government and the Taliban,
wherein the latter vowed to safeguard the passage of the pipeline within its
strongholds. With the completion of the Turkmenistan portion of the pipeline
and the Taliban’s commitment to the safe operationalisation of its Afghan section,
TAPI may no longer be written off as a pipedream (Alikozai, 2018).
As for IPI, the proposal remained in a state of dormancy for so long, primarily
on account of India’s apprehensions to the pipeline’s transit through Pakistan.
Even an alternate proposal to reroute the pipeline through the shallow
continental-shelf of Pakistan has not picked up steam. However, hopes of a gas
pipeline from Iran has remained in suspended animation with the conception of
a second alternative, which is one that traverses the deep seabed of the Arabian
Sea between Oman and the western Indian state of Gujarat. This is the proposed
Iran-Oman-India Deep-sea gas pipeline project. South Asia Gas Enterprise
Private Limited (SAGE), a joint venture between a New Delhi-based logistics
firm and UK-based deepwater services-provider, along with a consortium of
other multinationals, that have already expressed a fervent interest in undertaking
the ambitious project. The project has been officially christened the ‘Middle
East to India Deepwater Pipeline’ (MEIDP) (Press TV, Iran, 2017).
Bereft of the Pakistan-challenge, but replete with logistical challenges, the
pipeline, once materialised, will create a new chapter in the South Asian energy
security landscape. The MEIDP project would in fact complement any
breakthroughs expected from the promising Chabahar Port complex, besides
giving some thrust to the proposed multi-modal International North-South
Transport Corridor (INSTC) that links India, Iran and Russia via the logistically
shortest trade route. Another eventuality that deserves mention is an integrated
gas corridor connecting Turkmenistan, Iran and India; given that Iran already
imports Turkmen gas via an inbuilt pipeline network. A feeder pipeline is already
being constructed to link Chabahar Port with the gas lanes from Turkmenistan.
This, coupled with proposed gas swaps between Russia and Iran (via the Caspian
Sea or routed through Azerbaijan), could offload more Iranian gas (from its
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southern fields) for supply to India through the MEIDP (Vaid, 2016). The crucial
US support for TAPI, over an Iranian gas-sourced pipeline project, has created
a looming cloud of uncertainty for the latter. Given the threat of US sanctions,
major western oil companies and service/technology providers remain cautious
about partaking in any venture that boosts Iran’s economic leverage in the South
Asian region.
The MBI pipeline project has withstood the test of time, going on from ‘the
pipeline that wasn’t’, to the ‘pipeline that could be’. India had shelved the project,
a decade back citing opposition from Bangladesh’s then leader Khaleda Zia.
However, with Sheikh Hasina in power, India has received an immense morale
boost in terms of executing its economic projects that inter alia focuses on the
development of its Northeast region. The MBI pipeline may get a second lease
of life from the Hydrocarbon Vision 2030 – the MPNG’s flagship proposal for
bringing economic development in the Northeast using the hydrocarbon sector
as an important facilitator (Press Information Bureau, Government of India,
2016). This pipeline, along with the multi-modal Kaladan Transit Transport
Project, presents an opportunity before India to make up for the lethargy that
had cost it a fruitful energy partnership with resource-rich Myanmar. Where
India had once lost its golden opportunity, China seized the prize for itself when
it successfully constructed a gas pipeline (supplementing the previously built
oil pipeline) from the promising Shwe offshore gas field (Engh, 2016). Perhaps
it is time for India to recalibrate its flawed strategies and indulge in some serious
energy diplomacy.
Conclusion
India’s energy consumption is no doubt rising to exponential levels. For a
nation invariably confronted with the challenges of balancing economic growth
with social development, guaranteeing energy access to its multifarious
population remains a daunting task. While on one side, there is a pressing need
to bridge the gap between the rising, gross national energy demand and lagging
supply, the flipside necessitates energy penetration and energy integration across
the country’s diverse geographic landscape with its multiple demographic tiers.
However, development does not strictly entail improving per capita energy
consumption, if it does not involve a sustainable approach that promotes growth
with less carbon footprints. Unlike coal and oil, as a resource still awaiting
optimisation to its promised potential, natural gas fares well as a cleaner fossil
fuel that qualifies as a bridgehead in the transition from coal and oil to renewable
energy. More pertinently, in the fledgling renewable energy sector, given the
problems of erratic power supply, (due to the inconsistent availability of the
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energy generation source) and the nascent state of battery-based storage, gas-
based power plants are more equipped to make up for any transmission losses
during peak hours. This particularly holds true in India’s case and hence, an
urgent requirement arises to scale up the proportion of natural gas in the energy
mix of a country, which is destined for strong growth.
Transcending regressive partisan politics, it must be acknowledged that the
enthusiasm shown by the Modi administration in promoting natural gas usage
holds India in good stead, both for now and the future. Be it in the areas of
indigenous natural gas production, or overseas sourcing, there is a tangible
demonstration of a proactive policy that pegs India’s energy requirements to
optimising gas usage. While foreign investment is crucial to rejuvenating India’s
ailing hydrocarbon sector, most importantly the upstream segment, India’s
foreign policy too needs to be calibrated with a streamlined energy diplomacy
component. Oil companies need not be lectured on how to negotiate; but the
government’s pursuit of energy diplomacy could still largely influence the
prospects of its oil companies abroad.
Therefore, by extending the required diplomatic support and leverage/
advantage, the Indian administration’s overseas energy policy should work in
tandem with the interests of its companies. The foremost priority in acquiring
equity blocks overseas must be to fulfil India’s energy requirements; but the
companies ought to be given their basic share of autonomy in negotiating
contracts and marketing their produce – an untradeable liberty that enables their
maturation into top-notch majors with sufficient international experience. OVL
is a classic example of how an Indian exploration major excelled overseas with
the right mix of operational and managerial finesse, combined with the
unwavering support of the Indian governmental apparatus wherever need be.
To conclude, India must make use of all possible means to raise the volume
of gas in its domestic energy basket. The cascading reforms in the natural gas
sector are a welcome sign as these are expected to bear fruit with the rising
robust demand for the commodity from various sectors of the national economy.
The policy-makers will have to walk the tightrope in terms of deciding whether
to swiftly go for gas price deregulation or wait until the market attains full
maturity with an empowered end-user base. As a matter of fact, there is
justification to the subsidies extended towards the fertiliser industry –
traditionally the top consumer of natural gas. To elucidate, it plays a substantive
role in supporting agriculture as well as the Micro, Medium and Small Enterprises
(MSMEs) – which are the mainstay of the unorganised sector that constitutes
the backbone of the Indian economy. Said that, in a country with an inbred
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penchant for thrift and frugality, and where process-based innovation trumps
product-based innovation, natural gas is poised to have a bright future.
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